TechBay.News

By Tech Bay News Staff

A federally funded U.S. supercomputing program designed to boost American research and innovation is now facing bipartisan scrutiny over concerns it may be inadvertently providing advanced computing power to Chinese military-linked institutions.

At the center of the controversy is the National Science Foundation’s ACCESS program — short for Advanced Cyberinfrastructure Coordination Ecosystem: Services & Support — a nationwide network of high-performance computing systems used by universities, national laboratories, and researchers working on cutting-edge projects ranging from artificial intelligence to materials science and cybersecurity.

Lawmaker Raises National Security Alarm

Rep. John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, warned this week that a structural loophole in ACCESS may allow Chinese institutions — including some on U.S. export-control blacklists — to remotely use U.S.-funded computing resources.

In a letter sent to NSF interim director Brian Stone, Moolenaar argued that while ACCESS formally requires principal investigators to be U.S.-based, the system allows those investigators to add foreign collaborators who can log in remotely from abroad.

That collaboration feature, he says, risks undermining years of U.S. export-control policy.

“By accessing U.S.-based high-performance computing resources remotely, these entities may be able to conduct advanced simulations, data processing, and model training from within China without ever having to obtain export-controlled GPUs or licenses,” Moolenaar wrote.

Chinese Military-Linked University Cited

Among the institutions flagged is the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), China’s premier military research university and a long-standing fixture on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List due to its ties to the People’s Liberation Army and its role in advanced weapons and supercomputing research.

NUDT has previously been linked to export-control violations, including a high-profile case in which U.S. chip-design firm Cadence Design Systems pleaded guilty to illegally supplying restricted technology to Chinese entities connected to the university.

Screenshots and internal system queries reviewed by congressional investigators reportedly show dozens of major Chinese institutions listed as potential or approved collaborators within ACCESS.

Why Remote Access Matters

High-performance computing resources like those provided through ACCESS can substitute for physical access to restricted hardware, such as advanced GPUs used to train large AI models or run complex weapons simulations.

In effect, critics argue, remote access to U.S.-based supercomputers could allow Chinese researchers to bypass hardware export bans entirely — performing sensitive work without importing controlled chips.

This concern comes as Washington has tightened restrictions on advanced AI hardware exports, even as recent policy moves — including conditional approval for some Nvidia H200 AI chip sales — have drawn criticism from lawmakers worried about mixed signals on technology containment.

Requested Actions and Oversight

Moolenaar has formally asked the National Science Foundation to:

• Revoke ACCESS permissions for Chinese military-linked or restricted entities
• Provide detailed records by February 6, 2026, showing which Chinese institutions have been approved
• Disclose whether any foreign users received computing allocations ahead of U.S. researchers

As of publication, NSF has not publicly responded to the inquiry.

A Broader Policy Tension

The dispute highlights a growing tension between America’s open-science tradition and its national-security obligations in an era of strategic competition with China.

Programs like ACCESS were built to encourage collaboration and accelerate discovery. But lawmakers increasingly argue that openness without rigorous safeguards can create vulnerabilities — particularly when taxpayer-funded infrastructure supports technologies with clear military and intelligence applications.

For now, ACCESS remains operational, but pressure is mounting for tighter controls, clearer eligibility rules, and stronger vetting of foreign collaborators.

As Washington recalibrates its approach to AI, supercomputing, and export controls, the outcome of this dispute may set an important precedent for how “open science” operates in a less-open world.